



WHAT IS THE INTERNAL POINT OF VIEW? 
Scott J. Shapiro* 
INTRODUCTION 
John Austin famously claimed that the idea of sanctions is “the key to the 
science[] of jurisprudence.”1  Thus, he held legal rules to be threats backed 
by sanctions and statements of legal obligations as predictions that the 
threatened sanctions will be carried out.  And before The Concept of Law 
was published in 1961, the concept of sanctions was central to every other 
positivistic theory of law as well.  Although Hans Kelsen sought to explain 
legal rules and obligations in terms of norms, he understood these norms to 
be directives to courts requiring that sanctions be applied.  Splitting the 
difference between Austin and Kelsen, Alf Ross conceived of legal rules as 
norms addressed to courts directing the use of sanctions and statements of 
legal validity as predictions that these norms will be followed. 
In The Concept of Law, H.L.A. Hart showed that sanction-centered 
accounts of every stripe ignored an essential feature of law.  This feature he 
termed “the internal point of view.”  Seen from the internal point of view, 
the law is not simply sanction-threatening, -directing, or -predicting, but 
rather obligation-imposing. 
Though the internal point of view is perhaps Hart’s greatest contribution 
to jurisprudential theory, this concept is also often and easily 
misunderstood.  This is unfortunate, not only because these misreadings 
distort Hart’s theory, but, more importantly, because they prevent us from 
appreciating the true infirmities of sanction-centered theories and the 
compelling reasons why they ought to be rejected. 
In this essay, I try to address some of these confusions.  What, exactly, is 
the internal point of view?  What role (or roles) does it play in Hart’s 
theory?  And how does an adequate appreciation for the centrality of the 
internal point of view lead to the rejection of sanction-centered theories? 
Briefly, my answers will be as follows.  The internal point of view is the 
practical attitude of rule acceptance—it does not imply that people who 
accept the rules accept their moral legitimacy, only that they are disposed to 
guide and evaluate conduct in accordance with the rules. 
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The internal point of view plays four roles in Hart’s theory:  (1) It 
specifies a particular type of motivation that someone may take towards the 
law; (2) it constitutes one of the main existence conditions for social and 
legal rules; (3) it accounts for the intelligibility of legal practice and 
discourse; (4) it provides the basis for a naturalistically acceptable 
semantics for legal statements. 
Finally, sanction-centered theories are unacceptable for three reasons:  
(1) They are myopic in that they ignore or obscure one of the motivations 
that people might have for obeying the law; (2) they are unable to account 
for the existence of legal systems; (3) they cannot account for the 
intelligibility of legal practice and discourse. 
I.  “INSIDER’S” VERSUS “INTERNALIZED” 
It is commonly thought that the “internal” point of view is synonymous 
with the “insider’s” point of view.  According to Stephen Perry, for 
example, “The general idea of the internal point of view is that an adequate 
jurisprudential account of law must at some point take into consideration 
how the practice looks to at least some of the practice’s participants, from 
the inside.”2  Likewise, Gerry Postema writes, “The law, like other similar 
social practices, is constituted not only by intricate patterns of behavioral 
interaction, but also by the beliefs, attitudes, judgments, and understandings 
of participants.  The practice has an ‘inside,’ the ‘internal point of view’ of 
participants.”3 
On this reading, Hart’s doctrine of the internal point of view is a 
methodological prescription that demands that legal theories resonate with 
the shared experiences of legal natives.  Jurisprudence must take the point 
of view (or views) of the insider:  It must be “hermeneutic” in orientation.  
Legal theories that take into account the internal point of view are thus to be 
contrasted with ones that ignore the beliefs and attitudes of those who live 
under the law.  The clearest examples of “external” theories are those 
motivated by concerns of philosophical behaviorism.  Many sociological 
theories of law are external accounts in this sense insofar as they limit the 
observer’s role to recording the frequency of compliance in a given 
population and correlating its absence with the appearance of sanctions.4 
I do not think that this interpretation of the internal point of view can be 
correct, however.5  This is seen most plainly from Hart’s use of the internal 
point of view to discredit sanction-centered theories of law, such as those 
 
 2. See Stephen R. Perry, Interpretation and Methodology in Legal Theory, in Law and 
Interpretation 97, 99 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995). 
 3. Gerald J. Postema, Jurisprudence as Practical Philosophy, 4 Legal Theory 329, 332 
(1998); see also Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism:  Toward a Naturalized 
Jurisprudence, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 267, 295 n.126 (1997). 
 4. See, e.g., Donald Black, The Behavior of Law 6-8 (1976). 
 5. I discuss the matter in much greater detail in my reply to Stephen Perry. See Scott J. 
Shapiro, The Bad Man and the Internal Point of View, in The Path of the Law and Its 
Influence:  The Legacy of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 197 (Steven J. Burton ed., 2000). 
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proposed by Oliver Wendell Holmes and Hans Kelsen.  Hart argued that 
these theories are myopic because they ignore or mask the range of attitudes 
that people typically have towards the law.  The problem with “bad man” 
theories such as Holmes’s is that they assume that people are motivated to 
follow the law solely to avoid sanctions, rather than because rules require 
such behavior.  These theories, Hart says, “define [the internal point of 
view] out of existence.”6  The problem with Kelsen’s theory, he claims, is 
that it focuses exclusively on one technique that the law uses to motivate 
conduct to the exclusion of all others.  The law not only directs officials to 
punish those who do not comply with the rules, but it also provides 
guidance for those who want to live up to their obligations.7 
If the internal point of view simply means the insider’s point of view, 
then this critique would be unintelligible.  After all, Holmes’s bad man is an 
insider himself, namely, one whose curiosity about the law is aroused solely 
by his aversion to sanctions.  Holmes’s theory, therefore, does not define 
the insider’s point of view out of existence; rather, his account is every bit 
as hermeneutic as Hart’s.  The problem with Holmes’s theory, rather, is that 
it privileges one type of insider’s point of view over another.  By focusing 
solely on the perspective of the bad man, sanction-centered theories define 
the other point of view, namely, the internal point of view, out of existence. 
What, then, is the internal point of view?  As Hart used the term, the 
internal point of view refers to the practical attitude of rule acceptance.  
Someone takes this attitude towards a social rule when he accepts or 
endorses a convergent pattern of behavior as a standard of conduct.  Thus, 
the internal point of view refers to a specific kind of normative attitude held 
by certain insiders, namely, those who accept the legitimacy of the rules.  
Hart is very clear on this point: 
[F]or it is possible to be concerned with the rules, either merely as an 
observer who does not himself accept them, or as a member of the group 
which accepts and uses them as guides to conduct.  We may call these 
respectively the ‘external’ and the ‘internal points of view.’8 
As this passage makes plain, the “internal” point of view is synonymous 
with the “internalized,” rather than the “insider’s,” perspective.  Whereas 
the phrase “the internal point of view” is univocal—it refers to a specific 
practical attitude—the “external point of view,” on the other hand, is 
dangerously ambiguous.  This is because there are at least two ways in 
which an attitude can be opposed to the internal point of view.  Because the 
internal point of view is the practical attitude of norm-acceptance, a 
practical attitude towards the law that does not involve acceptance would 
qualify as an external attitude.  The standpoint of Holmes’s bad man is 
external in this sense.  But an attitude might be external by failing to be a 
practical attitude at all.  Someone whose interest in the law is primarily 
 
 6. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 91 (2d ed. 1994). 
 7. See id. at 40. 
 8. Id. at 89. 
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theoretical, who simply wishes to describe how members of a group regard 
and respond to a set of rules and, perhaps, who wishes to make predictions 
as well, takes the external point of view in this second sense. 
Making matters more complicated, there are actually two different 
theoretical points of view one can take towards the law.  First, one might 
seek to describe social behavior without recourse to the beliefs and attitudes 
of those whose lives are subject to the demands of legal institutions.  In the 
absence of this information, the observer must be content with recording the 
frequency of compliance in a given population and correlating its absence 
with the appearance of sanctions.  Hart calls this behaviorist stance the 
“extreme” external point of view.9  By contrast, one might seek to describe 
social behavior by attending to the attitudes of the members of the group.  
This “hermeneutic” point of view seeks to describe the law, in other words, 
by reference to the insider’s point of view. 
Hart himself, qua legal theorist, actually takes the external point of view 
towards the law, though here external means theoretical and the particular 
theoretical stance is hermeneutic.10  It is precisely because he takes a 
hermeneutical perspective towards the law that he rejects sanction-centered 
theories, for, although such theories take into account the bad man’s point 
of view, they ignore the internalized point of view.  Though hermeneutic, 
they are nevertheless myopic. 
Figure 1 in this essay attempts to summarize this rather confusing set of 
distinctions and terminology.  The most fundamental distinction that Hart 
draws is between the practical and theoretical points of view.  The practical 
point of view is that of the insider who must decide how he or she will 
respond to the law.  The theoretical perspective is that of the observer, who 
is often, but not necessarily, an outsider, who studies the social behavior of 
a group living under law. 
With respect to the practical point of view, there are two attitudes that the 
insider can take towards the rules:  acceptance and nonacceptance.  Anyone 
who accepts the rules has, according to Hart, taken the internal point of 
view.  Anyone who does not accept the rules, either because he is like the 
bad man and takes the practical, but non-accepting, point of view, or 
because he is merely observing and hence does not take a practical stance at 
all, has taken the external point of view. 
Likewise, with respect to the theoretical point of view, there are two 
types of stances the observer can take.  She can either take the hermeneutic 
point of view, which Hart himself takes, or she can take a behavioristic one.  
As mentioned, both the hermeneutic and behaviorist stances are external 
 
 9. Id. 
 10. H.L.A. Hart describes his methodological approach as “hermeneutic” in the 
introduction to his Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy. See H.L.A. Hart, Essays in 
Jurisprudence and Philosophy 13 (1983) (“[W]hat is needed is a ‘hermeneutic’ method 
which involves portraying rule-governed behaviour as it appears to its participants . . . .”).  
  
2006] WHAT IS THE INTERNAL POINT OF VIEW? 1161 
points of view in Hart’s sense, although Hart describes the latter as the 



















II.  TO ACCEPT A RULE 
Hart’s internal point of view, therefore, is the practical attitude of rule 
acceptance.  But what exactly does it mean to “accept” a social rule?  Here 
things get a bit murky.  Hart says that to accept a social rule is to regard a 
pattern of behavior “as a general standard to be followed by the group as a 
whole.”11  It is to treat existence of the rule as a “reason and justification”12 
for action, as the “basis for claims, demands, admissions, criticism, or 
punishment,”13 and as establishing the “legitima[cy]”14 of these demands 
and criticisms.15 
Given Hart’s description, it is natural to think that to take the internal 
point of view is to believe that the rule is a legitimate standard of conduct, 
where legitimacy is understood as moral legitimacy or legitimacy from the 
perspective of right reason. 
This interpretation would be mistaken, however.  Hart is quite clear that 
one does not have to believe in the moral legitimacy of the law in order to 
accept its authority: 
 
 11. Hart, supra note 6, at 56. 
 12. Id. at 11 (emphasis omitted). 
 13. Id. at 90. 
 14. Id. at 56. 
 15. Hart notes that to take the internal point of view is not to experience particular 
“feelings of compulsion.” Id. at 57, 88.  Rather, it is to possess a “critical reflective attitude.” 
See id. at 57. 
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But the dichotomy of ‘law based merely on power’ and ‘law which is 
accepted as morally binding’ is not exhaustive.  Not only may vast 
numbers be coerced by laws which they do not regard as morally binding, 
but it is not even true that those who do accept the system voluntarily, 
must conceive of themselves as morally bound to do so, though the 
system will be most stable when they do so.  In fact, their allegiance to the 
system may be based on many different considerations:  calculations of 
long-term self-interest; disinterested interest in others; an unreflecting 
inherited or traditional attitude; or the mere wish to do as others do.16 
From Hart’s perspective, people can have any number of reasons for 
accepting rules.  They may be guided by a rule because they think that it is 
in their long-term self-interest to be so committed.  Judges might apply the 
law simply to pick up their paychecks. 
Given that the internal point of view is not necessarily the moral point of 
view, what does Hart mean when he characterizes it as acceptance of a rule 
as a standard of conduct?  The best way to understand Hart’s position is to 
examine the various ways in which he thought the internal point of view is 
expressed.17 
The attitude manifests itself most obviously through conforming 
behavior.  When one takes the internal point of view towards a rule, one 
acts according to the dictates of the rule.18  Of course, there must be 
something more to the internal point of view, given that the bad man also 
conforms to the rules.  The second way in which the internal point of view 
is expressed is through critical evaluation.19  Thus, participants who accept 
the rules criticize others, and perhaps even themselves, for failing to 
conform to the rules.  Furthermore, not only do deviations from the rule 
engender criticism, but such criticism is deemed to be legitimate and made 
with good reason.20  Presumably, the acknowledgment of the criticism’s 
legitimacy is signaled, at least in part, by the fact that the criticizers are not 
themselves criticized for engaging in the criticism. 
Finally, the internal point of view is usually expressed by statements that 
use normative terminology such as “ought,” “must,” “right,” and 
“wrong.”21  Thus, if someone accepts the rule that men must bare their 
heads upon entering a church, this practical attitude might be expressed by 
statements of the form, “You ought to take off your hat in Church” or “It 
was wrong of me not to take off my hat last Sunday.”  Hart calls these 
statements “internal statement[s],” because they normally express the 
internal point of view.22  Hart contrasts these practical statements with 
 
 16. Id. at 203 (emphasis added). 
 17. Id. at 56-57, 88-91.  For an excellent discussion of Hart’s practice theory of rules, 
see Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms 49-58 (2d ed. 1990). 
 18. Hart, supra note 6, at 55-56. 
 19. Id. at 55. 
 20. Id. at 55-56. 
 21. Id. at 57. 
 22. Id. at 102-03 (emphasis omitted). 
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theoretical statements that others accept a particular rule.  For example, 
someone might say, “Episcopalians accept a rule requiring men to take off 
their hats in Church.”  Hart calls these “external statements” because they 
usually express the external point of view.23  They are statements that a 
particular group accepts certain rules normally made by those who do not 
accept those rules themselves. 
We should understand Hart’s internal point of view as a commitment to 
act in all of the above ways.  That is, one takes the internal point of view 
towards a rule when one intends to conform to the rule, criticizes others for 
failing to conform, does not criticize others for criticizing, and expresses 
one’s criticism using evaluative language.  This interpretation is confirmed 
by Hart’s postscript:  “[Acceptance] consists in the standing disposition of 
individuals to take such patterns of conduct both as guides to their own 
future conduct and as standards of criticism which may legitimate demands 
and various forms of pressure . . . .”24  This “standing disposition,” 
furthermore, can be instilled or adopted for any reason whatsoever. 
[S]ome rules may be accepted simply out of deference to tradition or the 
wish to identify with others or in the belief that society knows best what is 
to the advantage of individuals.  These attitudes may coexist with a more 
or less vivid realization that the rules are morally objectionable.25 
III.  THE EXISTENCE CONDITIONS FOR SOCIAL RULES 
In the previous section, I described the internal point of view as the 
practical attitude of rule acceptance and showed one negative use that this 
concept plays within Hart’s theory.  As we saw, the existence of the internal 
point of view is used to discredit the positivistic accounts of Hart’s 
predecessors, namely, the sanction-centered theories of Austin, Kelsen, 
Ross, and Holmes.  The flip side of this critique, of course, is the positive 
explanatory role that rule acceptance plays in Hart’s account, namely, that 
the reason why some members of groups act as they do is because they 
accept certain rules from the internal point of view.  This point of view 
explains why they conform to their rules, criticize deviations, and couch 
their guidance and evaluations in normative terminology. 
We might say that Hart’s rejection of sanction-centered theories stems, at 
least in part, from his desire to develop a general theory of law.  Hart 
insisted that a jurisprudential theory take into account and study all of the 
methods that the law provides for the guidance of conduct.  As Hart 
rhetorically asks, why should the law (and hence legal theory) not also care 
about the “‘puzzled man’ or ‘ignorant man’ who is willing to do what is 
required, if only he can be told what it is?”26  An adequate jurisprudential 
 
 23. Id. at 103 (emphasis omitted). 
 24. Id. at 255. 
 25. Id. at 257. 
 26. Id. at 40. 
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theory must include within its ambit the fact that the law may guide conduct 
either through its rules or through the sanctions attached to its rules.27 
To be sure, Hart did privilege the internal point of view in his theory of 
the law.  While he thought that everyone in a given group might take the 
internal point of view, he claimed that it is impossible for everyone to take 
the external point of view.  At the very least, legal officials would have to 
be committed to the law if we were to say that a group had a legal system.  
In this section, I would like to explain Hart’s reasons for taking this 
position. 
Recall that according to Austin, a rule is a legal rule just in case it was 
issued, explicitly or tacitly, by someone who is habitually obeyed and does 
not habitually obey anyone else.  Habits, therefore, are central to Austin’s 
conception of sovereignty and legality.  Hart argued, however, that habits 
cannot underpin sovereignty because habits cannot confer rights and 
authority.  For this, social rules are needed. 
Hart develops his theory of social rules via a comparison with social 
habits.28  Social rules and habits are similar, according to Hart, in one 
important respect:  Both are behavioral regularities.29  Although it is not 
necessary that every member of the group engage in the behavior, most 
must for a social rule or habit to exist.30 
Apart from this commonality, there are three salient differences between 
social rules and habits.  First, deviations from social rules, as opposed to 
habits, engender criticism by members of the group.31  Second, these 
criticisms are taken to be legitimate.32  Third, when a social habit exists, 
those who engage in the pattern of behavior need not be aware that they are 
engaged in the behavior, nor need they intend to teach others to engage in it 
or seek to maintain it.33  By contrast, a group has a social rule only when 
members of the group treat the existing pattern of behavior as a common 
standard for behavior.  The group has a social rule, in other words, when 
they take the internal point of view towards a certain behavioral 
regularity.34 
Social rules, therefore, have what Hart calls both an external and internal 
aspect.35  They have an external aspect, which they share with habits, in 
that most members of the group conform to the behavior.  Social rules and 
habits are regularities of behavior.  But they also have an internal aspect, in 
that these regularities are explained by the fact that members of the group 
 
 27. See id. at 91. 
 28. Id. at 55-60. 
 29. See id. at 55. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 55-56. 
 33. Id. at 56. 
 34. Id. at 56-57. 
 35. Id.; see also id. at 88-91. 
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possess a critical reflective attitude.  Members of the group act as a rule 
because they accept that there is a rule. 
It is crucial to note that Hart is not simply setting out conditions under 
which it is proper to say that a group accepts a social rule or that the group 
has a rule.  He is proposing conditions for the existence of social rules.36  
According to Hart, a social rule exists in a group G just in case members of 
the group engage in a certain practice from the internal point of view.  On 
Hart’s account, therefore, the sovereign has the right to create rules if, and 
only if, there exists a social practice of treating his directives as binding.  
This practice cannot be a mere habit but must have an internal aspect as 
well.  Members of the group cannot simply act in accordance with the 
sovereign’s will, but must act because of it. 
Thus far, we have been discussing Hart’s theory of social rules, in which 
social rules exist only when they are practiced.  Hart also recognizes that 
rules might exist even though they are not followed.  Jaywalking may be 
illegal, for example, even though everyone does it.  The rule prohibiting 
jaywalking, in other words, exists in some jurisdictions even though there is 
little conforming behavior. 
For Hart, a rule R1 may be said to exist even in the absence of a social 
practice when there exists some other social rule R2 that requires certain 
members of the group to heed R1.  In Hartian terminology, a primary rule 
exists when it is “validated” by a secondary rule.37  We might say, for 
example, that the jaywalking rule exists or is legally valid because it is 
validated by the rule of recognition in the jurisdiction in question.  The 
warrant for such statements depends on the fact that legal officials take the 
internal point of view towards their rule of recognition. 
The existence of the internal point of view, therefore, underwrites the 
existence of all legal rules.  Without supposing that officials take the 
attitude of norm-acceptance to the rule of recognition, there could be no 
rule of recognition and hence law could not exist as a conceptual matter.  
To the extent that sanction-centered theories fail to countenance the 
existence of such attitudes, they fail to account for the very possibility of 
legal systems. 
IV.  THE INTELLIGIBILITY OF LEGAL PRACTICE 
It is sometimes thought that Hart introduced the internal point of view in 
order to explain how social rules, and in turn the law, can give group 
members reasons for action.  On this account, Hart criticized Austin for 
thinking that habits and threats can confer genuine rights and impose 
genuine obligations, where “genuine” here means from the perspective of 
 
 36. See, e.g., id. at 58 (“The acceptance, and so the existence, of such a rule will be 
manifested during Rex I’s lifetime in part by obedience to him, but also by 
acknowledgements that obedience is something to which he has a right by virtue of his 
qualification under the general rule.” (emphasis added)); see also id. at 109-10.  
 37. See id. at 107-10. 
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right reason.  In contrast to habits and threats, he argued, only social rules 
are reason-giving entities.  Social rules have this normative power because 
they are regularities of behavior accepted from the internal point of view. 
Given this interpretation, of course, Hart’s claims are thoroughly 
perplexing, for he never explains how the internal point of view imbues 
rules with normative force.  After all, social rules differ from habits in that 
the former are constituted by two types of social regularities, namely, 
behavioral and attitudinal, whereas habits are constituted merely by one 
type of social regularity.  Hart, though, does not tell us why this second 
regularity makes a difference.  How does the fact that legal officials think 
that the sovereign has the right to rule actually give him the right to rule?  
And how does the fact that most members of the group believe that others 
have a reason or an obligation to Φ give them a reason or obligation to Φ?  
As Jules Coleman and Brian Leiter have put it, 
The claim that the authority of a social rule derives from the internal point 
of view thus amounts to the view that what makes a norm reason giving is 
the fact that the majority of individuals treat it as such.  But the authority 
of a rule (its reason-giving capacity) cannot be grounded in the mere fact 
that individuals treat it as reason giving.38 
Clearly, Hart did not intend for the internal point of view to provide an 
explanation for the reason-giving nature of social rules and law.  Indeed, I 
do not believe that Hart thought it the task of legal theory to provide any 
such explanation.  I argue instead that Hart’s aim in introducing the internal 
point of view was, in addition to the two previously mentioned, to render 
the thoughts and discourse of legal actors comprehensible.39  The internal 
point of view, in other words, does not explain the morality or rationality of 
legal activity, but rather its very intelligibility. 
One way to appreciate Hart’s critique of Austin is to imagine how actors 
who lived in an Austinian system would conceive of their habitual 
obedience.  Is it possible for anyone to understand his or her deference to 
the sovereign as recognizing the sovereign’s right to rule?  Clearly not.  
Habits, Hart reminds us, are not normative activities.40  Someone who 
engages in a habit does not take the habit as a standard of conduct and 
attempt to conform to it.  Indeed, one may not even be aware that he has the 
habit.  Furthermore, one does not criticize oneself for failing to act in a 
habitual manner.  Except in bizarre circumstances, no one says to oneself, 
 
 38. Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Legal Positivism, in A Companion to Philosophy 
of Law and Legal Theory 241, 247 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996).  Jules Coleman and Brian 
Leiter go on to offer an argument for the reason-giving nature of the internal point of view.  
Regardless of whether these arguments are successful, I don’t think that they represent an 
accurate interpretation of Hart’s theory (and, judging by Coleman’s later work, see Jules L. 
Coleman, The Practice of Principle:  In Defence of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory 
103 (1998), neither does Coleman).  
 39. “Legal actor” refers to anyone who intends to do what the law requires him or her to 
do. 
 40. See Hart, supra note 6, at 56. 
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“I should have said ‘um’ more often today.”  By contrast, those who accept 
rules that require deference to the sovereign do recognize the sovereign’s 
right to rule.  They regard themselves as being bound by his 
pronouncements and justified in criticizing others for failing to obey.  For 
them, the sovereign is the sovereign. 
The same exercise shows the inadequacies of Austin’s theory of 
obligation.  Is it intelligible for anyone to regard the threats of the sovereign 
as creating obligations?  Again, the answer is clearly no.  Since one does 
not look upon the sovereign as having the right to rule, one does not regard 
his words as creating standards of conduct.  If one believed it possible to 
escape punishment, then he would regard himself free to disobey.  Nor 
would he criticize anyone else for disobeying.  However, those who 
respond to the directives of the sovereign not simply as threats, but as rules, 
do conceive of themselves and others as obligated to act accordingly.  They 
accept the words of the sovereign as setting new standards of conduct and 
evaluation, as guiding them not just with accurate warnings of evil, but with 
legitimate demands of conduct. 
Hart’s aim in introducing the internal point of view, therefore, was not to 
account for the reason-giving nature of legal practice, but rather to explain 
the intelligibility of the activity.  Insofar as participants conceive of the law 
as a social institution consisting of rights and obligations, they must, on the 
pain of incoherence, also accept certain rules that require and permit various 
courses of conduct.  A theory like Austin’s that does not admit rules, or 
their acceptance, thus renders incomprehensible the way legal participants 
think about their actions.  Note that this critique of Austin is far more 
damaging than the one we first encountered in Part II.  The claim here is not 
simply that Austin is wrong about the actual motivations of legal 
participants, but that he could not possibly be right.  Because legal activity 
is rule-guided activity, a theory that privileged habits and sanctions over 
rules not only gives a poor explanation of the actions of participants, but, 
more importantly, fails to account for the coherence of their thoughts.41  As 
Hart pointed out, 
The difference may seem slight between the analysis of a statement of 
obligation as a prediction, or assessment of the chances, of hostile 
reaction to deviation, and our own contention that . . . its characteristic use 
is not to predict this but to say that a person’s case falls under such a 
rule. . . .  Indeed, until its importance is grasped, we cannot properly 
understand the whole distinctive style of human thought, speech, and 
action which is involved in the existence of rules and which constitutes 
the normative structure of society.42 
 
 41. Note that Hans Kelsen’s theory escapes this general criticism insofar as it treats the 
law as consisting of norms. See generally Joseph Raz, Kelsen’s Theory of the Basic Norm, in 
The Authority of Law:  Essays on Law and Morality 122-45 (1979).  
 42. Hart, supra note 6, at 88. 
  
1168 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75 
V.  THE SEMANTICS OF LEGAL DISCOURSE 
There is one further role that the internal point of view plays in Hart’s 
theory:  It enables him to give naturalistically acceptable semantics for legal 
statements. 
Although no longer popular as a philosophical position, at the time that 
Hart wrote The Concept of Law Scandinavian realism was in full bloom.  
The Scandinavian realists, such as Axel Hägerström, Karl Olivecrona, and 
Alf Ross, were skeptical of “rule-talk” and believed that thinking and 
speaking of rules as “existing” or as “legally valid” was tantamount to 
engaging in mysticism.43  Their skepticism stemmed from a commitment to 
an austere version of naturalism according to which normative facts do not 
exist.  They sought, therefore, to render legal language empirically 
respectable by proposing predictive theories of legal obligation and validity.  
To say that a rule is legally valid, for these realists, is not to ascribe a 
“mysterious property” to a rule, but rather to make a prediction about the 
behavior of a court.  In this way, legal statements would express 
naturalistically acceptable propositions. 
As we have seen, Hart thought the predictive analysis to be a complete 
mistake, but he did sympathize with the Scandinavian impulse to make 
room for law in the natural world.  Hart, therefore, proposed an account of 
legal semantics that attempted to make legal language naturalistically 
reputable.  Again, the internal point of view plays the main role here. 
Corresponding to the distinction between the internal and external points 
of view, Hart distinguishes between internal and external statements.44  An 
internal statement expresses the acceptance of a rule.  In legal contexts, 
examples include statements of the form, “It is the law that . . .” or “[t]he 
rule that . . . is legally valid.”45  According to Hart, such statements 
normally express two distinct attitudes.  First, they express acceptance of 
the rule of recognition of the particular jurisdiction as the appropriate test 
for determining membership in the legal system.  Second, internal legal 
statements express judgments that certain rules pass that test.  Hart takes 
pains to note that such statements do not state those latter judgments.  To 
say that it is the law that no vehicles are permitted in the park is not to say 
that the no-vehicles-in-the-park rule passes the tests of legal validity set out 
in the system’s rule of recognition.  Rather, the statement expresses that 
very judgment without stating it.46 
 
 43. See, e.g., Axel Hägerström, Inquiries Into the Nature of Law and Morals (Karl 
Olivecrona ed., C.D. Broad trans., 1953); Karl Olivecrona, Law as Fact (2d ed. 1971); Alf 
Ross, On Law and Justice (1958).  For a general overview of Scandinavian Legal Realism, 
see Jes Bjarup, The Philosophy of Scandinavian Legal Realism, 18 Ratio Juris 1 (2005).  For 
Hart’s critique of this jurisprudential school, see Hart, Scandinavian Realism, in Hart, supra 
note 10, at 161. 
 44. Hart, supra note 6, at 102-03. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See id. at 103. 
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On the other hand, external statements do not express the acceptance of a 
rule or its application.  Statements such as, “In England, they 
recognize whatever the Queen in Parliament enacts,” state the existence of a 
social rule.47  Of course, one who makes such a statement might in fact 
accept such a rule, but the statement itself does not express the acceptance. 
External statements, therefore, are fact-stating, whereas internal 
statements are not.  If I say, “They have a rule around here about men 
taking off their hats in church,” I am making a statement about the world, 
namely, that a behavioral and attitudinal regularity exists within a certain 
group.  If my statement is true, then the term “rule” actually refers to some 
hard social fact.  By contrast, internal statements do not state facts.  An 
internal legal statement is like the umpire’s “out,” expressing, though not 
stating, certain legal judgments.48 
By claiming that all legal statements are either internal or external 
statements, Hart sought to secure the empirical respectability of legal 
language.  To say, for example, that a rule is legally valid is not to state that 
some ghostly entity possesses some mystical property of validity.  Rather, it 
is to express the attitudes of the speaker towards the rule of recognition and 
its applicability.  Furthermore, to say that the rule of recognition exists does 
state a fact, but the rule referred to is anything but ghostly.  It is simply a 
fact that certain people act and think a certain way. 
Although he does not use such labels, Hart’s semantic program might be 
described as being a mixture of cognitivism and non-cognitivism.  With 
respect to understanding assertions about the existence of secondary legal 
rules, such as the rule of recognition, Hart is a cognitivist.  These statements 
state propositions and, hence, are capable of being true or false.  This 
cognitivism rests on a reductive account of social rules.  For Hart, a social 
rule just is a social practice and, hence, to say that the rule of recognition 
exists is simply to state that a certain regularity of behavior is generally 
accepted as a standard of conduct.49  With respect to statements about the 
existence of primary legal rules, on the other hand, Hart is a non-cognitivist.  
These statements do not state propositions and, hence, cannot be true or 
false.  This particular brand of non-cognitivism is a form of norm-
expressivism.50  To state that a legal rule is valid is to express the 
acceptance of a norm that requires that certain actions be followed. 
Although Hart believed that the internal point of view enabled the legal 
theorist to give no-nonsense, naturalistically acceptable semantics for legal 
statements, Hart does not argue, nor is there reason to believe, that this is 
the only way to find a place for legal facts in the natural world.  It is true 
that norm-expressivism is a very promising and appealing route for a 
 
 47. See id. at 102. 
 48. See id. at 102-03. 
 49. See id. at 110. 
 50. For a similar interpretation of Hart as an early norm-expressivist, see Kevin Toh, 
Hart’s Expressivism and His Benthamite Project, 11 Legal Theory 75 (2005). 
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naturalist to take, but it would be premature at this stage in the metaethical 
debate to suppose that no other semantic project could succeed. 
It should also be pointed out that one does not have to go as far as Hart 
does in claiming that the very meaning of internal legal statements is given 
by their expressive function in order to see why sanction-centered theories 
such as Austin’s, Holmes’s, and Ross’s, cannot be correct.51  With any 
plausible jurisprudential theory, legal statements will characteristically play 
an expressive role.  When a judge says that one is obligated to pay one’s 
taxes and that the failure to do so constitutes an offense, it seems as though 
the judge is expressing approval towards paying one’s taxes and 
condemning the failure to do so.  This is even more obvious when certain 
acts are considered wrong and the perpetrators are deemed guilty in a court 
of law. 
But if a theory of law did not admit of rules, or their acceptance, one 
could not account for the expressive function of legal discourse.  For, if we 
take all obedience to be mere habitual behavior, we will be overlooking the 
very attitudes typically expressed by statements such as “The sovereign has 
the right to be obeyed.”  Similarly, if someone is threatened with some 
harm unless he Φ’s, but we ignore his attitude towards the propriety of the 
threat or treat his statements about such threats as mere predictions about 
the likelihood of their execution, we will be unable to account for the 
pragmatic function of statements such as “I am obligated to Φ.” 
CONCLUSION 
Sanction-centered theories must be rejected for three reasons.  First, they 
are myopic in that they focus exclusively on one type of motivation that 
people might have for obeying the law, namely, to avoid being sanctioned, 
while ignoring or effacing other reasons that they might have for 
compliance, namely, a concern for following the rules themselves.  Second, 
they are incapable of explaining the very possibility of a legal system, for 
they overlook the attitudes of rule acceptance that are metaphysically 
responsible for the existence of law.  Third, most such theories are 
incapable of accounting for the intelligibility of legal practice and 
discourse, for it is nonsensical to think or say that the law imposes certain 
obligations and confers certain rights unless one also accepted the rules that 
imposed those obligations and conferred those rights. 
In each case, sanction-centered theories are flawed because they ignore 
the internal point of view.  If a jurisprudential theory is to be general and 
account for the existence of law and the intelligibility of legal thought and 
discourse, then it must countenance the practical attitude of rule acceptance.  
So Hart argued, and in this regard I think he was right. 
 
 51. Kelsen’s theory escapes this objection as well. See supra note 41. 
